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Feedback Models for Collaboration and Trust in Crisis Response Networks 
Abstract 
Scholars have devoted increasing efforts to understanding crisis response 
networks (Denning 2006a, 2006b; Stephenson and Schnitzer 2006), especially in the case 
of networks comprised of disparate members who acknowledge no higher organizational 
authority.  Coordination within disaster response networks is difficult for several reasons, 
including the chaotic nature of the crisis, a need for the various organizations to balance 
shared goals (crisis amelioration) and organization-specific goals, and the lack of a 
central organizing authority (Denning 2006a, 2006b; Stephenson and Schnitzer 2006).  
More recently, scholars (Stephenson and Schnitzer 2006) have suggested crisis response 
networks might be able to coordinate effectively in the absence of a central organizing 
authority.   
Grounded in general system theory (e.g., Bertalanffy 1962, 1968; Kast and 
Rosenzweig 1972; Senge 1990; Weinberg 1975), and particularly the use of feedback 
loops (Masuch 1985; Richardson 1999), this paper seeks to understand whether feedback 
loops comprised of reciprocal resource commitments can engender greater trust and 
commitment among organizations responding to a crisis.  This paper describes a 
campaign of experimentation set in the Maritime Interdiction Operation, an experimental 
campaign operated by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Network Innovation 
and Experimentation.   
Keywords:  Collaboration, Commitment, Crisis Response, Feedback, Networks, Trust 
1 
13th ICCRTS: C2 for Complex Endeavors 
Introduction 
 Interorganizational relationships can take many forms.  Some relationships 
involve a central organization (in for-profit contexts, e.g., a channel captain (Tuominen 
2004)) coordinating the efforts of other partner firms; these firms might be longer-term, 
more stable partners, e.g., strategic alliances (Vadarajan and Cunningham 1995), or firms 
assembled ad hoc for a specific task (Achrol 1997).  Other arrangements include less 
centrally-managed alliances among unrelated organizations (Achrol 1997).  Recently, 
scholars have devoted increasing efforts to understanding networks of organizations that 
form to respond to crises, whether these crises are humanitarian relief efforts, disaster 
response efforts, or simply the accomplishment of large, urgent projects (Denning 2006a, 
2006b; Stephenson and Schnitzer 2006).  Denning (2006a, 2006b) has proposed the 
hastily formed network, a network of unrelated organizations assembled ad hoc around 
the accomplishment of a specific, urgent task.   
How networks of organizations coordinate their efforts has been the subject of 
some debate in the literature.  In the specific case of crisis response networks, scholars 
generally conclude that coordination is difficult, in part because of the chaotic nature of 
the crisis response setting (see Stephenson and Schnitzer, 2006, for a brief summary).  
Along with the nature of the task, the organizational form presents coordination 
challenges as well.  The network of organizations responding to the crisis is comprised of 
members that share some goals (e.g., crisis amelioration); however, these organizations 
might also have different (possibly competing) collateral goals, and often operate under 
constraints specific to their own organization (Stephenson and Schnitzer 2006).  Finally, 
the lack of a central organizing authority has been argued as hindering coordination 
2 
13th ICCRTS: C2 for Complex Endeavors 
(Denning 2006a, 2006b; Stephenson and Schnitzer 2006), although recent scholarship 
(Stephenson and Schnitzer 2006) suggests crisis response networks might be able to 
coordinate effectively in the absence of a central organizing authority. 
This paper draws on general system theory (e.g., Bertalanffy 1962, 1968; Kast 
and Rosenzweig 1972; Senge 1990; Weinberg 1975), and in particular a discussion of 
feedback loops (Masuch 1985; Richardson 1999), to explore how crisis response 
networks coordinate actions among disparate members who acknowledge no higher 
organizational authority. 
Feedback Loops 
 A fundamental component of systems theory is control, in which actions 
interrelate in a series of feedback loops (e.g., Richardson 1999), which represent a 
“circle…of cause-effect relationships” (Senge 1990).  In feedback loops, an action 
triggers other actions, which may in turn trigger additional actions, ultimately leading 
back to a causal effect on the original action (Masuch 1985).  Over time, this system of 
actions can change its initial state based on a comparison of the new state to some 
standard, either normative (value-based) or factual; such changes can be desirable or 
undesirable, depending on whether the change is toward or away from a desirable state. 
In this view, positive movements from a normative state are deviation amplifying 
feedback loops, whereas negative movements from a normative state are deviation 
minimizing loops.  Positive movements from a factual state are termed self-reinforcing 
feedback loops, whereas negative movements from factual states are self-correcting loops 
(Masuch 1985).   
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 Some scholars (e.g., Richardson 1999) have noted possible sources of confusion 
among various literatures over the nature of feedback loops as a construct.  This view 
argues that all literatures understand feedback as being positive or negative, but that the 
nature of positive and negative feedback appears to vary somewhat.  In cybernetics, for 
example, positive feedback is deviation-amplifying, whereas negative feedback is 
deviation-minimizing.  No value judgment is attached to the amplification or 
minimization of the deviation in question; that is, no value judgment is attached to the 
initial state from which the system is deviating.  On the other hand, this view suggests, 
some social science authors have broadened the feedback construct by attaching value 
labels.  In these instances, positive feedback assumes the deviation being amplified 
represents a desirable change from an undesirable state; conversely, negative feedback 
assumes the need to minimize an undesirable deviation away from a desirable state.  A 
further confusion comes from some social science scholars’ blurring of the construct 
control with the distinct construct influence (Green and Welsh 1988).  
 A further classification of feedback loops involves intersecting the normative and 
factual standards.  Figure 1, adapted from Masuch (1985), summarizes these 
intersections.  Some feedback loops generate undesirable changes that pull a system away 
from a normatively-defined desirable state of stability; the feedback loops self-reinforce 
the now-objectively (or factually) increasing deviations from the normatively-defined 
status quo.  Other loops can keep a system in an undesirable status quo, i.e., in a state of 
stagnation; this occurs when deviation amplifying loops have a self-correcting component 
to them.  On the other hand, some loops self-reinforce deviation-counteracting behaviors 
and pull a system toward a desired goal; in these cases, the status quo is undesirable and 
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change—thus deviation from the status quo—is desirable.  Finally, some feedback loops 
self-correct deviation counteracting behavior; in these cases, the status quo is desirable, 
and the feedback loops self-correct against deviations from this desirable state. 
 Drawing on this brief overview, the following section explores ways in which 
organizations can engender coordination among disaster response networks through the 
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 Deviation amplifying 
(Positive movement 
relative to normative state) 
Deviation counteracting
(Negative movement 




relative to factual 
state) 
Undesirable change 




movement away from 
undesired status quo) 
Self-correcting 
(Negative movement 
relative to factual 
state) 
Undesirable permanence  
(Stagnation; kept from 
desired change) 
Desirable permanence  
(Stability; deviations 
from desired normative 
state of stability are 
continually corrected) 
Figure 1. Feedback loop summary (adapted from Masuch 1985) 
Coordinating Crisis Response Networks 
 Feedback loops suggest potentially helpful ways of understanding how to enhance 
coordination among the disparate groups comprising disaster response networks.  This 
section draws on the literature on interorganizational relationships and governance to 
suggest a possible feedback loop that serves as an example of how to increase 
coordination among groups.  Indirectly, these same feedback loop models can serve a 
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diagnostic approach to understand why coordination might be lacking (e.g., why the level 
of collaboration is stagnated at a low level); a self-correcting deviation amplifying 
feedback loop results in such a pattern of behavior, and this recognition might lead to 
appropriate introspection and countermeasures to break that pattern. 
 At many points during a crisis response effort, groups might surmise that greater 
coordination would lead to synergistic performance in alleviating the crisis situation.  In 
this case, the goal would be movement away from an undesirable state of separate action 
toward a state of greater coordination.  The relational governance literature suggests a 
possible self-reinforcing, deviation counteracting feedback loop that could pull the 
organizations from their normatively defined undesirable state of separate action toward a 
desired state of synergy.    
 Generally speaking, the relational governance literature suggests that 
organizations perform better when they trust each other (Smith and Barclay 1997) and are 
committed to their relationship (Daugherty, Richey, Hudgens and Autry 2003; Doz and 
Hamel 1998; Gundlach, Acrol and Mentzer 1995; Morgan and Hunt 1994).  Trust, the 
expectation by one party that another party is both credible (reliable) and benevolent 
(Moorman, Zaltman and Despande 1993; Morgan and Hunt 1994), typically develops 
from a more calculated to a more relational form (Doney and Cannon 1997; see also 
Stephenson and Schnitzer 2006).   
A second relationship governance construct is communication strategy.  
Communication strategy, comprised generally of the frequency, direction, modality, and 
content of communications, can affect both qualitative and quantitative outcomes (Mohr 
7 
13th ICCRTS: C2 for Complex Endeavors 
& Nevin 1990).  Distributional channel research suggests a moderating role for constructs 
such as channel structure, climate and power (Mohr & Nevin 1990).  Collaborative 
communication, specifically, has a stronger effect when relationships are less integrated 
and less controlled; thus, it is a possible governance mechanism in these situations 
(Mohr, Fisher & Nevin 1996). 
 Finally, the commitment of resources to a joint effort has been shown to have a 
positive effect on knowledge sharing (Wagner and Buko 2005).  This finding suggests 
that resource commitment might positively affect coordination among organizations.   
In summary, this literature, supported by an initial partially-confirmatory study by 
Stephenson and Schnitzer (2006), suggests that an organization (Org 1) might signal 
another organization (Org 2) that it is both credible and benevolent, by committing 
resources toward the accomplishment of the desired shared goal of ameliorating the crisis 
situation.  (Note that, while this paper contemplates a network setting, only one 
organizational dyad is considered here for simplicity of explication.)  This resource 
commitment might involve constructing a communication network where none exists; 
providing a shared workspace, either real or virtual; or any number of other observable 
resource investments.  Org 1 might further volunteer information it has gathered about 
the crisis to Org 2, and seek Org 2’s advice in how to approach a resolution to the crisis.  
This resource commitment, along with an initial collaborative communication strategy, 
signals Org 1’s credibility (“we are serious about ameliorating this crisis, and are 
devoting resources to that goal”) and benevolence (“we will share our resources and 
information with you, and are interested in your opinions, too”) to Org 2.   
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The literature suggests Org 1’s resource commitment and use of collaborative 
communication strategies should engender trust on the part of Org 2.  To the extent this 
occurs, org 2 should become more committed to working in a closer relationship with 
Org 1 to address the crisis; to invest its own resources toward shared goal 
accomplishment and reciprocate the use of collaborative communication strategies with 
Org 1.  Org 2’s behavior, in return, signals its credibility and benevolence to Org 1, 
completing the feedback loop and resulting in greater coordination.  Figure 2 summarizes 
this “virtuous” feedback process. 
 
 
Org 1 Res Commit 
& Collaborative 
Communication 
Org 2 Res Commit 
& Collaborative 
Communication 
Org 1 trust in Org 2
Org 2 trust in Org 1
Org 1 commitment 
to relationship with 
Org 2 
Org 2 commitment 
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Figure 2. Virtuous feedback process 
The literature suggests that both trust (Smith and Barclay 1997) and relationship 
commitment (Daughtery et al 2003; Doz and Hamel 1998; Gundlach, Acrol and Mentzer 
1995; Morgan and Hunt 1994) enhance interorganizational performance.  Unfortunately, 
cooperative behavior among organizations comprising a crisis response network, while 
desirable, has been an elusive goal (Stephenson and Schnitzer 2006).  Grounded in 
general system theory and particularly the use of feedback loops, and drawing on the 
interorganizational literature for possible feedback mechanisms, this study explores 
whether trust and commitment develop among organizations responding to a crisis.  To 
the extent that organizations trust each other, the literature suggests they should become 
increasingly committed to their relationship, and should enjoy differential performance.  
This study seeks to understand whether a feedback loop comprised of reciprocal resource 
commitments and effective communication strategies can engender greater trust and 
commitment among organizations responding to a crisis.  The next section develops the 
research design for this study.   
Research Design 
 This section describes the research design for the study.  It begins by describing 
the overall design parameters including defining the constructs and variables of interest, 
presenting hypothesized relationships among the variables, and interpreting the Pareto set 
of the design, functional and criteria spaces (Statnikov and Matusov 2002) within the 
context of the study.  The section concludes by outlining a campaign of experimentation 
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to “explore and mature knowledge” (Alberts and Hayes 2002, 2005) of how crisis 
response networks form. 
Design Parameters 
 This study suggests that networks form in the face of a crisis through the use of 
resource commitment and collaborative communication, which can serve as signals of 
trustworthiness by one organization that engender trust on the part of other organizations.  
The overarching proposition of this study is that reciprocal resource commitments and 
collaborative communication can serve as a feedback loop creating greater levels of trust 
and relationship commitment, and thus influencing the structure of the crisis response 
network.   
 Constructs and variables.  The variables of interest include design space variables, 
criteria space variables and functional constraints (Statnikov and Matusov 2002).   
 Design space variables include resource commitment and collaborative 
communication.  Resource commitment is measured using a Likert scale (1 = very little 
commitment, 7 = substantial commitment) (see, e.g., Daugherty, Autry and Ellinger 
2001).  Collaborative communication is measured using a scale adapted from Mohr, 
Nevin and Fisher (1996).  This scale assesses the frequency of communication between 
organizations, whether the communication is bidirectional, the formality of the 
communication, and the degree to which communication is coercive.   
 Functional constraints include the communications systems available and 
environmental factors including the infrastructure available (both physical and economic) 
and the physical scope of the crisis.   
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 Criteria space variables focus on network characteristics and relational 
governance.  Networks are typically studied in terms of relationships among their 
members, including the status of members (their centrality and prestige), the nature of a 
member’s relationships (range, density, and embeddedness), and characteristics of any 
dominant organization(s) (Burt 1980; Gulati 1998; Lorenzoni & Baden-Fuller 1995).  In 
this study, the speed in which the network is formed will be measured in minutes.  The 
status of members will be measured in terms of their centrality within the network and 
the degrees of separation between organizations, while the nature of relationships will be 
assessed by counting the range and density of ties to other organizations. 
Relational governance variables of interest are trust and relationship commitment.  
Trust, the expectation that another party is both credible and benevolent (Moorman, 
Zaltman and Despande 1993; Morgan and Hunt 1994) will be measured by a survey 
instrument administered to study participants.  This scale is based on one developed by 
Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995).  Relationship commitment is the belief that a 
relationship is both important and worth investing effort to maintain and perpetuate 
(Morgan & Hunt 1994; Moorman, Zaltman & Desphande 1993; Wilson 1995).  
Relationship commitment will be measured using a survey instrument adapted from 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) and Anderson and Weitz (1989).   
 Relationships among constructs.  Greater resource commitment and greater use of 
collaborative communication strategies should engender greater levels of both trust and 
relationship commitment.  Their effect on trust should be direct, and their effect on 
relationship commitment will be moderated by trust.  Greater levels of trust and 
commitment will in turn be positively related to various network structure variables, 
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including strength of ties and number of ties.  Greater resource commitment and use of 
collaborative communication should be positively related to speed of network formation.  
Infrastructure and scope of crisis will moderate these effects.   
 Pareto set of criteria.  This study hypothesizes that reciprocal feedback loops of 
relational governance constructs will affect both the formation of crisis response 
networks and the relationships among the network members as the networks develop over 
time.  Trust and commitment both develop over time, thus network structure could take 
relatively longer to develop (although “longer” is still relative to the duration of the crisis 
scenario).  Network ties should strengthen over time, perhaps shifting among members as 
time passes.  Clusters among organizations should form over time, and the patterns of 
these clusters might be expected to change over time as well.  These phenomena suggest 
a Pareto set of outcomes, in which network structure variables develop over time.  
Stronger ties and a more well-defined network structure should allow greater 
coordination and enable more effective performance toward alleviating the crisis 
situation; however, these stronger ties and more stable structure forms over time.  The 
proposed optimal solution is one in which sufficient network structure forms, through the 
relational governance-based feedback loop, sufficiently quickly to minimize the impact 
of the crisis.   
Campaign of Experimentation 
 Campaigns of experimentation “explore and mature knowledge” (Alberts and 
Hayes 2002) about a subject.  Following Alberts and Hayes (2002, 2005), this section 
describes a campaign of experimentation to explore and mature knowledge about how 
networks form rapidly (e.g., during times of crisis).  This section describes the campaign 
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as flowing from the discovery phase of experimentation, which “generate new ideas” or 
explore the feasibility and utility of concepts (Alberts and Hayes 2002; 2005), to the 
hypothesis testing phase, in which proposed hypothesized relationships are tested more 
formally.  This campaign allows for a demonstration phase, if appropriate based on the 
results of the previous phases.  This demonstration phase would most likely assess the 
role of well-understood and well-measured relational governance constructs in explaining 
part of the network formation. Each category of experiment will include a description of 
the specific experimentation infrastructure (or setting), how the individual experiments 
will be run, the type(s) of data to be collected, and the proposed data analysis 
methodologies to be used.   
 Discovery experiments.  Discovery experiments are “hypothesis generating” 
experiments designed to explore the feasibility and utility of the subject area (Alberts and 
Hayes 2002, 2005).  Specific discovery experiments for this study will focus on 
understanding whether (and if so, how) the feedback loop process operates.  Specifically, 
the discovery experiment validates the measures of collaborative commitment and 
resource commitment among different network members, and explores both whether 
these measures are positively correlated between members over time?  Positive 
correlation among these measures over time might suggest the formation of a reciprocal 
feedback loop.  Additionally, the discovery experimentation phase will assess various 
measures of network formation (formation speed, centrality and degrees of separation 
within the network, and range and density of ties to other organizations) to see whether 
they vary systematically with the commitment of resources or use of collaborative 
communication. 
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 The discovery experimentation phase is envisioned as two phases.  In the first 
phase, members of organizations that have responded to crises will be interviewed to 
understand their general impressions of whether and how networks formed in responses 
to these crises.  Interviews will be developed, conducted, transcribed and analyzed in 
accordance with generally accepted qualitative interviewing techniques (see, e.g., Glaser 
and Strauss 1967; Rubin and Rubin 2005) with the primary goal of gaining greater 
understanding of whether the constructs under consideration appear to be feasible and 
useful to the study.  
The second phase of discovery experimentation will take the form of a table-top 
longitudinal scenario designed to test the pattern of resource commitment and 
collaborative commitment as a possible feedback loop leading to network formation.  
This table-top exercise will involve a fictional crisis scenario played out using 
collaborative software (e.g., Microsoft Groove).  Participants will be mid-level military 
officers from the United States Department of Defense (DoD), as well as military 
members of allied nations and DoD civilian employees, all of whom are seeking graduate 
degrees at the Naval Postgraduate School.  If a sufficient sample size is available, 
participants will be assigned randomly into organizational groups (i.e., multiple 
participants assigned to each “organization”); this approach would alleviate possible 
construct validity (Shadish, Cook and Campbell 2002) concerns over whether 
organizational trust can be assessed using single individuals to represent different groups.  
Demographic information will be collected to analyze for possible biases among 
participants.  In the scenario, participants will be allocated resources and will be allowed 
to communicate (or not) with other participants to respond to a crisis scenario.  
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Transcripts of the interaction will be analyzed for evidence of collaboration, using Mohr, 
Fisher, and Nevin (1996) to guide the analysis.  Commitments of resources will be coded 
for correlational analysis to assess patterns of commitment and communication that might 
indicate the formation of a feedback loop leading to network formation.  The data will 
also be coded to assess the network variables such as speed of formation and strength and 
number of ties. 
 Hypothesis testing experiments.   
 The hypothesis testing phase of the campaign is designed to test formally 
hypothesized relationships suggested by the discovery phase and by existing theory 
(Alberts and Hayes 2002, 2005), and discussed previously in the section on “relationships 
among constructs”.  Much like the discovery phase, the hypothesis-testing phase 
contemplates two steps.  In the first step, a table-top simulation exercise will be held.  
This simulation will be structured similarly to the discovery phase (e.g., random 
assignment, similar data collection and analysis), but will be qualitatively different (i.e., a 
different scenario) from that in the discovery phase.  Along with analyses of transcripts of 
interaction, participants will also be interviewed and/or surveyed to assess their beliefs 
about how existing constructs such as interorganizational trust (Kumar, Scheer, and 
Steenkamp, 1995; Moorman, Zaltman and Despande 1993; Morgan and Hunt 1994), 
resource commitment (Daugherty, Autry and Ellinger 2001), collaborative 
communication (Mohr and Nevin 1990; Mohr, Fisher, and Nevin 1996), and relationship 
commitment (Morgan & Hunt 1994; Moorman, Zaltman & Desphande 1993; Wilson 
1995) operated during the study. Measurement instruments will be based on those used in 
these prior studies.   
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 The second phase of hypothesis-testing contemplates a small scale field exercise, 
in which participants will construct a small scale communication network.  Participants 
will be assigned randomly to groups.  Groups will be allocated the necessary resources, 
but allocations will be unequal, thus requiring some groups to commit greater resources 
than others to the goal.  Group members will be asked afterwards to assess the role of the 
same constructs listed above in the success of their network formation.   
 Limitations  Every study suffers from limitations, and this proposal is no 
different.  That said, campaigns of experimentation seek to minimize the limitations by 
building knowledge systematically in a variety of ways.  Nevertheless, a brief discussion 
of some of the limitations, and how they are addressed, follows.   
 The limitations of qualitative studies, such as the interviews in the discovery 
phase of the campaign, are well-known; for example, such studies are often criticized for 
a perceived lack of generalizability and rigor (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Isaac and 
Michael 1995). Setting aside the accuracy of those criticisms, which can to some extent 
be countered or even dismissed as irrelevant (e.g., Glaser and Strauss 1967; Isaac and 
Michael 1995), exploratory qualitative research becomes a strength a in the discovery 
phase of an experimental campaign, which is designed to surface important concepts and 
explore their utility and feasibility for inclusion in future research.  Such exploratory 
discovery work serves to ground future research in “real world” situations and data 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967).   
Limitations of the simulation studies used in the discovery and hypothesis-testing 
phases include the perceived lack of ties to real world situations; to an extent, these 
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concerns are countered by using multiple real world scenarios—at least one in each of the 
discovery  and the hypothesis-testing phases (Alberts and Hayes 2002).  Additionally, the 
scenarios are designed to maximize validity and credibility (Alberts and Hayes 2002).  
Finally, the simulation design will include random assignment of participants to 
treatments and will be longitudinal, both of which should improve internal validity (Isaac 
and Michael 1995; Shadish, Cook and Campbell 2002); conversely, the simulation will 
aim for a duration that does not risk maturation effects, and the nature of the study—to 
understand the how networks form and change in a crisis response scenario—limits the 
threat of mortality (organizations might well choose to leave the network in a real crisis) 
(Isaac and Michael 1995; Shadish, Cook and Campbell 2002).  
 On the other hand, in both the simulation and field exercise, the “crisis” is 
simulated primarily by time and through the use of a scenario.  This threatens external 
validity somewhat, in that scenarios are not likely to replicate the chaos inherent in real 
crises, but the use of military members as subjects adds elements of credibility and 
mitigates the threat to external validity somewhat, in that military members are used to 
rehearsing (“exercising”) for future actual events with much the same intensity as they 
would use when faced with those actual events. (Isaac and Michael 1995; Shadish, Cook 
& Campbell 2002).   
Conclusion 
This proposal describes a campaign of experimentation designed to “mature 
knowledge” about how crisis response networks form and operate.  This paper draws on 
general system theory (e.g., Bertalanffy 1962, 1968; Kast and Rosenzweig 1972; Senge 
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1990; Weinberg 1975), in particular the concept of feedback loops (Masuch 1985; 
Richardson 1999), to explore how crisis response networks coordinate actions among 
disparate members who acknowledge no higher organizational authority.  It blends 
discovery of new knowledge (the feasibility and utility of various constructs and 
relationships) with the testing of more formal hypotheses about network relationships.  In 
doing so, it answers the call to better understand how networks operate in times of crisis 
(Denning 2006a, 2006b; Stephenson and Schnitzer 2006).   
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Crisis Response Networks
►Interorganizational relationship formats
 Centralized control (channel captain)
►Longer-term (strategic partnerships) or ad hoc
 Unmanaged arrangements between unrelated 
organizations
 Newest hybrid: unmanaged ad hoc networks 




►How to coordinate ad hoc disaster response 
networks?
 No acknowledged central authority
 Goal “semi-compatibility”
►Some shared goals, some unique goals
 Task characteristics (intense, chaotic…)
Feedback loops
► Some (possible) confusion between cybernetics and 
social science interpretations (e.g., Richardson 1999)
Cybernetics Social Science
Positive feedback Deviation amplifying “Good”
(assumes deviation 
is “good”, i.e., away 
from undesired 
state)















relative to normative state)
Self-reinforcing
(Positive movement 
relative to factual state)
Undesired change








relative to factual state)
Undesired 
permanence 
(Stagnation; kept from 
desired change)
Desired permanence 
(Stability; deviations from 
desired normative state of 
stability are continually 
corrected)
(Adapted from Masuch (1985))
Building Coordination Through 
Feedback Loops
Resource commitment by Org 1 
Æ Signals Org 1 trustworthiness (credibility, benevolence) 
Æ Leads Org 2 to trust org 1
Æ Increases Org 2 commitment to relationship with 
Org 1 
Æ Increases Org 2 commitment of resources to  relationship 
with Org 1
Æ Increases resource commitment by Org 1
Self-reinforcing, deviation counteracting feedback loop that 
pulls away from undesirable status quo of no relationship 
or a lack of coordination
Building Coordination Through 
Feedback Loops
Effective communication strategy by Org 1 
Æ Signals Org 1 trustworthiness (credibility, benevolence) 
Æ Leads Org 2 to trust org 1
Æ Increases Org 2 commitment to relationship with 
Org 1 
Æ Increases Org 2 information flow to Org 1
Æ Increases information flow by Org 1 to Org 2
Self-reinforcing, deviation counteracting feedback loop that 
pulls away from undesirable status quo of no relationship 
or a lack of coordination
Design Parameters
►Overarching proposition:
Reciprocal resource commitments and 
collaborative communications





 Likert scale (1 = very little commitment, 7 = 
substantial commitment)
 See, e.g., Daugherty, Autry and Ellinger 2001
►Collaborative commitment
 Frequency, bidirectionality, formality, 
coerciveness










►Network characteristics (Burt 1980; Gulati
1998; Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller 1995)
 Member status (centrality, prestige)
►Centrality, degrees of separation
 Member relationships (range, density, 
embeddedness)
►Counts for range, density of ties
 Dominant organization(s)





 Trust (adapted from Kumar, Scheer and 
Steenkamp 1995)
 Relationship commitment (adapted from 




 Greater resource commitment and collaborative 
communication Æ greater trust and relationship 
commitment
►Trust both direct and indirect (moderating) effect
 Greater trust and relationship commitment positively 
associated with network characterstics
►Strength of ties, number of ties
 Greater resource commitment and collaborative 
communication Æ faster network formation
 Infrastructure and crisis scope will moderate effects
Pareto Set
►Networks develop over time (relative to crisis 
duration)
 Ties form, strengthen, change
 Clusters form, change
► Time is critical in crises
► Pareto set: trade time for stronger network 
relationships
 Stronger = longer to form, more effective response?




►Part 1: Qualitative interviews of crisis 
response participants (e.g., HFN 
participants)
 Assess constructs for feasibility and utility
 Ground research in real-world data
 Conduct and analysis using accepted qualitative 
techniques (e.g., Glaser and Strauss 1967; 
Rubin and Rubin 2005) 
Campaign of experimentation: 
Discovery phase
►Part 2: Table-top simulation
 Tests patterns of resource commitment and 
collaborative communication--feedback loop?
 Tests patterns of network formation




►Analysis by session coding on constructs above
Campaign of experimentation:
Hypothesis testing
►Part 1: Second simulation
 Similar to first in design
 Different scenario
 Add interviews and/or surveys to assess 
formally hypothesized relationships
 Analyze sessions (coding) and interview/survey 
results
Campaign of experiments: 
Hypothesis testing
►Part 2: Field exercise
 Scenario based
 Small network construction
 Random assignment to teams
 Disproportionate resource allocation 
 Analysis: observed data and post-hoc 
interviews/surveys
 Adds real-world element
Limitations
►Some, but experimental campaign mitigates
 Qualitative limitations (discovery phase)
►External validity, perceived rigor
►Strength in discovery phase
 Simulation limitations
►External validity: offset by military “exercises”, 
multiple scenarios
►Internal validity: random assignment, longitudinal
 But not so long as to risk maturation 
 Mortality not a risk (network members can leave in real 
world)
